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complexity of our responses to stimuli, the more tolerant we shall become of other sorts of human beings. When all three senses of "rationality" are lumped together, it may begin to seem self-evident that humans who are good at arming themselves with technical means for the gratification of their desires will also automatically adopt the right desires-those "in accordance with reason"-and will exhibit tolerance toward those with alternative desires because it will be understood how and why these undesirable desires were acquired. This produces the suggestion that the place where most of the technology comes from-the West-is also the place from which to get one's moral ideals and one's social virtues.
There are familiar philosophical as well as political reasons for doubting this assimilation and the consequent suggestion. The philosophical reasons are those shared by old-time American pragmatists like Dewey and the proponents of newfangled poststructuralist ideas like Derrida, and consist mostly of attacks on the very idea of rationality2. These reasons are the ones produced in the course of the familiar attacks on "rationalism," "phallogocentrism," "the metaphysics of presence," "Platonism," and so on. The political reasons are those shared by people who believe, as do Roger Garaudy and Ashis Nandy, that "The Western countries are sick"2-and by those, like myself, who believe that the West, although not sick, may have boxed itself, and the rest of the world with it, into a very tight corner. For liberals who are also pragmatists, as I am, questions about rationality and cultural differences boil down to questions about the relation between rationality, and rationality3. We just drop the whole idea of rationality2. Now I would like to turn to the notion of "culture" and, once again, to distinguish three senses of this term. Culture, is simply a set of shared habits of action, those which enable Philosophy East & West members of a single human community to get along with each other and with the surrounding environment as well as they do. In this sense of the term, every army barracks, academic department, prison, monastery, farming village, scientific laboratory, concentration camp, street market, and business corporation has a culture of its own. Many of us belong to lots of different cultures-to that of our native town, to that of our university, to that of the cosmopolitan intellectuals, to that of the religious tradition in which we were brought up, to those of the various organizations to which we belong or the various groups with which we have dealings. In this sense, "culture" is not the name of a virtue, nor is it necessarily the name of something human beings have and other animals do not. Ethologists talk about the culture of a band of baboons as easily as ethnologists talk about the culture of a human community, and both mean pretty much the same thing by the term. In respect to this neutrality between the nonhuman and the human, and in respect to a lack of evaluative force, culture, resembles rationality,. There is a difference in complexity and richness between the culture of a farming village and the culture of Buddhism, the same sort of difference as that which separates the rationality, of the amoeba from that of the squid, but not a difference of kind. Culture2 is the name of a virtue. In this sense, "culture" means something like "high culture." Prisoners often have little if any of it, but inhabitants of monasteries and universities often have quite a lot. Good indications of the possession of culture2 are an ability to manipulate abstract ideas for the sheer fun of it, and an ability to discourse at length about the differing values of widely diverse sorts of painting, music, architecture, and writing. Culture2 can be acquired by education, and is a typical product of the sort of education reserved for the wealthier and more leisured members of a society. It is often associated with rationality3, as in Matthew Arnold's suggestion that sweetness and light go together.
Culture3 is a rough synonym for what is produced by the use of rationality2. It is what supposedly has steadily gained ground, as history has gone along, over "nature"-over what we share with the brutes. It is the overcoming of the base and irrational and animal by something universally human, something which all persons and cultures are more or less able to recognize and respect. To say that one culture, is more "advanced" than another is to say that it has come closer to realizing "the essentially human" than another culture,, that it is a better expression of what Hegel called "the self-consciousness of Absolute Spirit, "a better example of culture3. The universal reign of culture3 is the goal of history.
It is often suggested these days that any culture, is worthy, ceteris paribus, of preservation. But this suggestion is usually tempered by the admission that there are some cultures-for example, those of concentration camps, criminal gangs, international conspiracies of bankers, and so on-which we should be better off without. It is sometimes also modified by suggestions, like that cited above, that some very large and prominent culture1 is "sick" or "decadent." There is a tension between, on the one hand, the theoretical idea that anything that takes as long to develop and solidify as a culture, or a species of living thing is worth keeping around and, on the other, the practical necessity to endanger or exterminate certain cultures (for example, the Mafia, the Thugs, the Nazis) or certain species (for example, the smallpox bacillus, the anopheles mosquito, the fire ant, or the krait).
I doubt that the suggestion that any and every culture, is prima facie worth preserving would ever have been made if there had not been a certain amount of confusion between the three senses of "culture" which I have distinguished. In particular, this suggestion would not have been made unless we had acquired the habit of seeing various cultures, as works of art, automatically worthy of appreciation as examples of the Richard Rorty triumph of culture3 over nature, and thus inferred that the failure to appreciate and cherish any such triumph would count as a failure in culture2. Such a failure would be philistine, insensitive, a betrayal of both culture2 and culture3.
The suggestion that we treat every culture as a work of art, prima facie worthy of preservation in the way in which every work of art is so worthy, is a comparatively recent one, but it is very influential among leftist intellectuals in the contemporary West. It goes along with a sense of guilt about "Eurocentrism," and with rage at the suggestion that any culture might be seen as less "valid" than another. To my mind, this set of attitudes is an attempt to preserve the Kantian notion of "human dignity" even after one has given up on rationality2. It is an attempt to recreate the Kantian distinction between value and dignity by thinking of every human culture, if not of every human individual, as having incommensurable worth-as surrounded by the aura which, for persons who are cultured2, surrounds works of art.
This nonrationalist version of Kantianism, however, often tries to combine the claim that every culture is as valid as every other with the claim that some cultures--or at least one, that of the modern Westare "sick" or "sterile" or "violent" or "empty"-empty of whatever it is that gives all other cultures, their "validity." Susan Sontag, for example, has urged that "the white race is the cancer of the planet"-a metaphor which suggests the need for radical surgery, for extirpation, the same sort of need as we feel in regard to the plague bacillus and the krait.
In the discourse of some contemporary leftist intellectuals, it sometimes seems as if only oppressed cultures counted as "real" or "valid" cultures, .3 Analogously, there has been a tendency among modern Europeans who pride themselves on their culture2 to think that only "difficult" and "different" works of art-preferably produced in garrets by rejected, marginalized artists-are "real" or "valid" instances of artistic creativity. This is accompanied by the suggestion that easily understood paintings by well-fed members of the Royal Academy, or much-watched soap operas produced by handsomely compensated hacks, fall short of the status of "art." To be cultured2, among leftist intellectuals of the present day, is to be able to see all oppressed cultures-all victims of colonialism and economic imperialism-as more valuable than anything done by or in the contemporary West.
This It is not to suggest that there is something outside the struggles of genes and memes which provides a criterion by which to sort out good outcomes from bad outcomes. The process of evolution has nothing to do with evaluative hierarchies, nor, pace Hegel, do the factors which determine the survival of memes. When a Deweyan describes history as the story of increasing human freedom, she is not saying that there is a power-rationality2-which somehow favors such freedom. She is merely saying that, given the evaluative hierarchy provided by our memes-the contingent historical outlook of a particular culture,-past events and future possibilities are usefully connected by a dramatic narrative of increasing freedom, increasing rationality3.
Before Dewey, Spencer had attempted to assimilate a triumphalist story of cultural development to a Darwinian story about biological Richard Rorty evolution. But Spencer tried to hold on to something like rationality2 and something like culture3. That is, he tried to hold on to the idea of an immanent teleology, one which provided a universalistic criterion of the "health" or "goodness" of an evolutionary or cultural development. As Dewey said in a 1904 essay on Spencer, Spencer's notion of "environment" was "but the translation of the 'nature' of the metaphysicians," and so for him evolution still tends to "'a single, far-off, divine, event'-to a finality, a fixity."4 Spencer, Dewey said, believed "in nature as a mighty force, and in reason as having only to cooperate with nature, instead of thwarting it with its own petty, voluntary devices, in order to usher in the era of unbridled progress."5 For Dewey, by contrast, "Nature" was not the name of a force, but simply of the results of a series of chances. "Reason" was the name neither of an extra, added ingredient nor of what was "natural" and "essential" to our species. The term denotes nothing more than a high degree of rationality,. For Dewey, there was a connection, but not a necessary or unbreakable one, between the increase in rationality, which comes with modern science and technology and rationality3-between efficiency and tolerance. As we became more and more emancipated from custom-more and more willing to do things differently than our ancestors did for the sake of coping with our environment more efficiently and successfully -we became more and more receptive to the idea that good ideas might come from anywhere, that they are not the prerogative of an elite, and not associated with any particular locus of authority. In particular, the rise of technology helped break down the traditional distinction between the "high" wisdom of the priests and theorists and the "low" cleverness of the artisan-thus contributing to the plausibility of a democratic system of government.
For Dewey, the New Science of the seventeenth century, and the new technology and the liberal reforms of the eighteenth and nineteenth, did not arise out of rationality2, and thus were not examples-as they were for Spencer-of human beings realizing their "natural" or "essentially human" abilities to better effect. They were simply exemplifications of a new flexibility and adaptability which some human communities had come to exhibit. This increasing flexibility led to profound social changes-the overthrow of feudal institutions, industrial capitalism, parliamentary government, colonialist expansion for the sake of cheap labor and new markets, female suffrage, two World Wars, mass literacy, the possibility of environmental catastrophe and of nuclear holocaust, and a lot of other recent developments. The very mixed bag of results produced by this new flexibility-this increased ability to alter the environment rather than simply fend off its blows-meant, in Dewey's eyes, that we Philosophy East & West typically solve old problems at the cost of creating new problems for ourselves. (For example, we eliminate old forms of cruelty and intolerance only to find that we have erected new, more insidious, forms thereof.) He had no wholesale solution to offer to the new problems which we had created, only the hope that the same experimental daring which had created the new problems as by-products might, if combined with a will to decrease suffering, eventually produce piecemeal solutions to these new problems.
Obviously, increasing flexibility and efficiency can as easily be used to oppress as to free-to increase suffering as to decrease it, to decrease rationality3 as to increase it. So there is nothing intrinsically emancipatory about a greater degree of rationality,. There is no a priori reason why it should produce a greater degree of rationality3. But, in fact, for various historically specific reasons, it has sometimes done so. One such reason was the prevalence of Christian rhetoric-a rhetoric of human brotherhood-in the communities which were the first to develop modern technology. Another was the fact that religious tolerance-thanks to the role of refugees from religious persecution in the founding of the United States and the compromises effected in various European countries in the wake of the wars of religion-became part of the public rhetoric of some of the great imperialist and colonialist powers. Religious tolerancetolerance concerning matters of ultimate importance-often paves the way for tolerance of other forms of difference.6
Unlike Kant, Hegel, and Spencer, Dewey had no arguments, based on claims about the nature of rationality2, to show that the rhetorics of human brotherhood and of tolerance of different opinions and styles of life are good rhetorics to have-rhetorics which pick out the right goals. He did not think it the function of philosophy to provide argumentative backup, firm foundations, for evaluative hierarchies.7 He simply took the rhetorics and goals of the social democratic movement of the turn of the century for granted, and asked what philosophy might do to further them. His answer was that it could try to change our self-image so that we would drop the whole idea of rationality2 and come to think of ourselves as continuous with the amoebas and the squids, although also continuous with those for more flexible, free, and imaginative humanoids who may be our descendants. These descendants would inhabit a social democratic utopia in which humans caused each other far less suffering than they presently do-a utopia in which human brotherhood was realized in ways we can now barely imagine. The unifying social ideal of this utopia would be a balance between the minimizing of suffering and the maximizing of rationality3-a balance between pressure not to hurt others and tolerance of different ways of living, between vigilance against cruelty and reluctance to set up a panoptic state. As good pragmatists, inhabitants of this utopia would not think of themselves as realizing the Richard Rorty true nature of humanity, living in accordance with rationality2, but simply as being happier and freer, leading richer lives, than the inhabitants of previous human communities.
What happens when the topic of cultural differences is seen from this Deweyan angle? When we try to do so, the following questions become salient: Would this Deweyan utopia preserve the geographically bounded cultural differences which are presently in place today-for example, the differences between Buddhist and Hindu, Chinese and Japanese, Islamic and Christian cultures-or would it throw all or most of these into a blender? If the latter, would that be a mistake? Would something very important have been irretrievably lost? Or would new cultural differences-the differences between the new cultures, that would spontaneously form within such a tolerant utopia-compensate for the loss of the old differences? When the question is posed in that way, the only plausible answer seems to be: nobody knows, but there seems to be no particular reason to hope for immortality for any one contemporary set of cultural differences, as opposed to hoping that it may eventually be supplanted by a new and more interesting set. In modern Europe, we do not much miss the culture of Ur of the Chaldees or of pagan Carthage. Presumably modern Indians do not miss the cultures that were displaced and gradually extirpated as the Aryan-speaking peoples descended from the North. In both cases, there is the feeling that we have lots of cultural diversity now, maybe all we need, and that the loss of Ur and Harapa are no more to be regretted than the loss of the eohippus, the mammoth, and the sabertoothed tiger. Given seven thousand species of birds, nobody mourns the archaeopteryx. Given the rich pluralism of modern Europe nobody cares much whether the last Gaelic or Breton speakers-or the last strictrhyme-scheme poets or Palladian architects-die out. We regret the imminent loss of the birds of paradise and the great whales because we know that it will take ten million years for new species of equal grandeur to evolve, but when it comes to Christianity, Islam, Buddhism, and the secular humanism of the modern West, we suspect that-given peace, wealth, luck, and utopian rationality3-these cultures, will only be extirpated when new cultures, of at least equal grandeur, are available to take their places.
The rather facile answer given above suggests that I have picked up the topic of cultural difference by the wrong handle. For this topic is a live one today because of the suspicion that what I blithely refer to as "the secular humanism of the modern West" is a sort of omnivorous monster, one which swallows up all other cultures1 and is incapable of producing diversity from within itself. This suspicion is linked to the further suspicion Philosophy East & West that the Deweyan views I hold-those which make up what Ashis Nandy calls an "evolutionist, technocratic, pragmatism"8-already beg all the important questions. For, in the eyes of Nandy and many others, Dewey himself is simply one more representative of a nonself-critical culture, which, even as it prides itself on kindness and tolerance, is engaged in destroying all possible cultural difference-a culture, which is, at bottom, philistine, sterile, and violent, intrinsically opposed to the pursuit of culture2 and to the development of rationality3. From Nandy's point of view, if I understand it, tolerance and pragmatism-rationality3 and the view that rationality2 does not exist-are like oil and water. Nandy would say that the pragmatic insistence on seeing a human being as simply one more organism, and human cultures as bearers of memes none of which are more closely related to something transhistorical (such as Nature or God) than others, is incompatible with the sort of tolerance of cultural differences which would allow a place for what is important in the Indian tradition. Nandy, I gather, accepts the views which, in the following passage, he describes Gandhi as holding:
Gandhi rejected the modern West primarily because of its secular scientific worldview. To him a culture which did not have a theory of transcendence could not be morally or cognitively acceptable. He knew that the ideological core of the modern world was post-Galilean science which prided itself on being the only fully secular area of knowledge. He also knew that legitimation of the modern West as a superior culture came from an ideology which viewed secularized societies as superior to non-secular ones; once one accepted the ideology, the superiority of the West became an objective evaluation.9 Dewey would deny that there could be an objective evaluation of the West as superior tout court. For superiority is, for a pragmatist, always relative to the purpose something is being asked to serve. But he would insist on three points. First, some of the West's achievementscontrolling epidemics, increasing literacy, improving transportation and communication, standardizing the quality of commodities, and so onare not likely to be despised by anybody who has had experience of them. Second, the West is better than any other known culture at referring questions of social policy to the results of future experimentation, rather than to principles and traditions taken over from the past. Third, the West's willingness to go secular, to give up on transcendence, has done a lot to make this second achievement possible. For reasons I have already sketched, Dewey saw secularization as one of the forces which helped make a social democratic utopia plausible. Dewey would entirely agree with Nandy that "only by retaining a feel for the immediacy of man-made suffering can a utopia sustain a permanently critical attitude toward itself and other utopias."'3 But he would argue that the West is likely to be, relatively speaking and despite its manifest cruelties, pretty good at retaining such a feel. He would base his argument on the fact that the West has developed a culture, of hopea hope of a better world as attainable here below by social effort-as opposed to the cultures, of resignation characteristic of the East. The Romantic social idealism which has pervaded European and American thought since the French Revolution is obviously not the whole story about the culture of the West, but neither is it to be neglected. Nandy, it seems to me, largely neglects this romantic strain.14 In a passage Dewey would have liked, Nandy writes:
Dewey thought it unlikely that the
[H]uman civilization is constantly trying to alter or expand its awareness of exploitation and oppression. Who, before the socialists, had thought of class as a unit of repression? How many, before Freud, had sensed that children needed to be protected against their own parents? How many believed, before Gandhi's rebirth after the environmental crisis in the West, that modern technology, the supposed liberator of man, had become his most powerful oppressor?'5 Dewey, however, would pick up on the examples of the socialists and Freud to claim that the West had taken the lead in such an expansion of awareness of exploitation and oppression-and in particular that psychoanalysis and the Socialist International were as representative of the West as, say, the KGB and the Union Carbide Company. Further, Dewey would be dubious about the claim that modern science and technology have oppression built in, as opposed to being tools which are equally useful for causing oppression and for relieving it. Nandy, however, believes that such a claim of neutrality is false. He decries the attempt to "operate as if the pathology of modern science lay only in its context"'6-as if it were not modern science itself but only its use by particular people which is blamable. He insists that "violence lies at the heart of modern science"'7 and that "today science has a built-in tendency to be an ally of authoritarianism."18 By contrast, he claims, "the traditional cultures, not being driven by the principles of absolute internal consistency and parsimony, did allow the individual to create a place for himself in a plural structure of authority." This, it seems to me, is Nandy's basic argument for the claim that "the main civilizational problem is not with irrational, self-contradicting superstitions, but with the ways of thinking associated with the modern concept of rationality."'9 Like Foucault, Nandy sees the culture created in the West by modern science as differing from "the traditional cultures" in that "modern science has already built a structure of near-total isolation where human beings themselves-including all their suffering and moral experience-have been objectified as things and processes, to be vivisected, manipulated, or corrected."20 Both Foucault and Nandy see in the modern West a panoptic society in which individuality-and thus rationality3-is becoming increasingly impossible. Dewey, by contrast, sees the rising amount of leisure, wealth, and security available in technological societies as making individuality-and thus rationality3-increasingly easy.
Nandy may be right in his prediction that the forces within Western culture which promote panopticism and prevent individuality will, in the end, outweigh romantic hopes for a utopia pervaded by rationality3. But Richard Rorty I am not sure that we philosophers can do much to decide whether he is right or not. That is, I am not sure that there is much point in our debating what is "central" or "essential" to the culture of the West or that of India, or in debating whether, for instance, the presence of "a theory of transcendence" in the latter has done more or less for individuality than the forty-hour work week and the welfare state has done for the former.
All that we philosophers can do, I suspect, is to sharpen the issues a bit. Nandy sharpens them by insisting that we question the common Western idea that science is neutral between political and cultural alternatives. All I can do to sharpen them is to point out that Dewey suggests a way of hanging on to science and technology while dropping the notions of rationality2 and of culture3, thereby setting aside the claim of the West to "objective" superiority, where "objective" has some ahistorical, transcultural sense. 3 -This goes along with a tendency to try for a "theory of oppression," an attempt which seems to me as likely to be fruitless as are theories of evil, or of power. I think that abstraction and generalization have, in such attempts, gone one step too far, and that we need to get back to the rough ground. On p. 356, Appiah quotes Suleri as saying that she is tired of being an "otherness machine" and notes that one effect of colonialism has been to force postcolonial intellectuals to have "the manufacture of alterity as our principal role." Appiah takes as the emblem of his essay a recent wooden Yoruba sculpture called Man with a Bicycle, which, Appiah says, is produced by someone who does not care that the bicycle is the white man's invention; it is not there to be Other to the Yoruba Self; it is there because someone cared for its solidity; it is there because it will take us further than our feet will take us; it is there because machines are now as African as novelists ... and as fabricated as the kingdom of Nakem." (P. 357) For another example of fruitful contamination, consider the kind of America we may have in the middle of the next century, a period when American yuppies may need not only to learn Japanese, but to know a lot about traditional Japanese culture, in order to get a promotion within an American economy owned and directed by Americanized Japanese.
-John
26 -Do we have a few centuries? Perhaps not. The possibility of nuclear holocaust or environmental catastrophe will not go away, if it ever does, for a long time-and if either happens, it will be fair, although a bit pointless, to blame "the West." But short odds seems no reason to stop constructing utopias.
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